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ABSTRACT
Crises test the resilience of public service organizations. Healthcare providers must 
respond and innovate within tight constraints to address challenges. Presenting 
COVID-19 as a knowable unknown (black swan event), we adopt information proces-
sing theory to investigate how healthcare providers and their suppliers address 
information asymmetry to support decision-making. Building on primary and second-
ary datasets, we demonstrate managers were innovating internal structural responses. 
For black swan events, in-house ‘intelligent clients’ are intrinsic not only in managing 
information uncertainty associated with early stages of the crisis, but also in addres-
sing information equivocality and joint decision-making with other organizations 
associated with implementing solutions.
KEYWORDS Crisis situation; information processing; information asymmetry; public services; pandemic; 
innovation
Introduction
The twenty-first century has seen several pandemics, including SARS, MERS, H1N1, 
and most recently COVID-19 (Kim 2020). The last is on an unprecedented scale and 
may ultimately infect upwards of a billion people, disrupting the lives of most of the 
World’s population (IRC 2020). Catastrophic events, such as economic and humani-
tarian crises, can change the way in which organizations do business (Rosenberg 1969; 
Martin-Rios and Pasamar 2017; Ansell and Torfing 2020), shifting the ‘rules of the 
game’ requires organizations to ‘do things differently’ rather than ‘doing things better’ 
(Bryson 1981; Phillips et al. 2006). Shocks to the system, such as COVID-19, force 
organizations to alter the way they work and make decisions, and creating the urgency 
to innovate (Li and Tallman 2011).
Managing such shocks, or black swan events (Taleb 2010), or before their occur-
rence -‘unknown unknowns’ (Rumsfeld 2002; Feduzi and Runde 2014), presents major 
problems for organizations, but prior work has shown innovation may be an effective 
response (Wenzel, Stanske, and Lieberman 2020). Significant research has investigated 
‘known unknowns’ (Ramasesh and Browning 2014), but less is known about 
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mitigation against ‘knowable unknowns’, which organizations could have foreseen but 
for some reasons have not (yet) (Ramasesh and Browning 2014; Feduzi and Runde 
2014). Here, managers need to be swift decision-makers and embrace organizational 
innovation – undertake new-to-the-organization management activities to motivate 
employees, coordinate activities (internally and with other organizations), and use, 
gather and distribute relevant information (Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 
2009). This is especially challenging for public service organizations (PSOs), which 
are government-owned and face additional burdens of navigating, for instance, reg-
ulatory frameworks, public safety standards, and often hierarchical, siloed, and bureau-
cratic processes that may hinder rapid and effective responses (O’Flynn 2020).
We argue COVID-19 is a knowable unknown – many organizations and govern-
ments were warned and aware of the catastrophic impact of a possible major global 
pandemic (e.g. Cabinet Office 2017; Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
2019). PSOs have faced other such ‘wicked problems’ such as terror attacks, climate 
events, and a global financial crisis, raising the question of how public innovation, 
cross-boundary collaboration and more resilient governance strategies can be achieved 
(Weber and Khademian 2008; Ansell and Torfing 2020) to address future black swan 
events. These events are characterized by information asymmetry; faced with the need 
to act swiftly, an organization may lack appropriate amount and quality of information 
(uncertainty) or must deal with information messiness (equivocality) (Galbraith 1974; 
Dahlmann and Roehrich 2019; Aben et al. forthcoming).
Currently, limited theoretical and empirical insights exist into how organizations 
address information asymmetry in black swan events. Research is needed to help 
underpin solutions leading towards more adaptable forms of governance in PSOs. 
Our study addresses this gap by drawing on information processing theory (IPT), an 
under-explored (but powerful) theoretical lens for exploring how PSOs address infor-
mation asymmetry in black swan events to drive innovative decision-making. Thus, 
this paper contributes to calls for further research to understand the impact of 
turbulent events (such as black swans) on effective public service governance (Ansell 
and Torfing 2020; O’Flynn 2020) by investigating the following research question: How 
do public service organizations innovate to address information asymmetry and drive 
decision-making in a black swan (knowable unknown) event such as COVID-19?
We examined the UK healthcare sector, a crucial sector tackling COVID-19, that 
throughout the pandemic has been confronted with information asymmetry (Flanagan 
and Collins 2020). Within healthcare organizations, the importance of effective infor-
mation and knowledge management was apparent as pharmaceutical companies 
searched databases for relevant treatments, and medical device manufacturers 
struggled with processing requests as demand for their products increased exponen-
tially (BSI 2021, 21). We primarily focused on the practices of healthcare PSOs and 
included insights from private sector suppliers to healthcare PSOs to develop our 
understanding of information asymmetry during the pandemic. Our research 
approach draws on datasets including interviews, organizational and government 
reports. The UK healthcare sector offers a revelatory sector to study information 
asymmetry in a black swan situation (COVID-19), highlighting some of the principal 
innovative responses associated with addressing information asymmetry and the need 
for rapid decision-making.
Building on prior studies highlighting failings in public sector policy, strategy, and 
practice, our study calls for a systematic organizational response to crisis decision- 
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making, highlighting the lack of a so-called (internal) ‘intelligent client’ capability 
(Czerniawska 2007). The intelligent client can establish their organization’s needs 
and select the right supplier(s), effectively managing the suppliers to ensure an appro-
priate response is delivered. Using the ‘management of information’ as a proxy, our 
contribution highlights the important role of the intelligent client in black swan events, 
going beyond extant studies which have cited its utility for business-as-usual procure-
ment and complex projects (Aritua, Male, and Bower 2009). In contrast to ‘business-as 
-usual’ decision-making situations, crisis situations are characterized by decision- 
making in which information uncertainty is addressed first by collecting information 
to allow initial and individual organization’s decision-making, while later phases 
address information equivocality and joint decision-making with other organizations.
Literature review
Innovation in public service provision
Categorizing organizations’ strategic responses to crises, Wenzel, Stanske, and 
Lieberman (2020) positioned four different approaches: retrenchment, persevering, 
innovating, or exit. While retrenchment refers to a decrease in an organization’s scope 
of activities (e.g. reductions in costs, products, assets, and product lines), persevering is 
a ‘business-as-usual’ approach, which although effective in the medium term, may 
depend upon the availability of slack resources that can be drawn upon during the 
crisis. Exit is unlikely to be an option for PSOs, yet it may form the basis for ‘strategic 
renewal’ (Wenzel, Stanske, and Lieberman 2020, 6). The final approach is innovating in 
which firms identify opportunities arising from the crisis. This approach may be an 
effective response if the crisis persists into the long-term, but requires substantial use of 
resources and capabilities that may have petered out if organizations have initially 
adopted retrenchment or persevering responses. Our study’s focus is on the innovating 
approach in crisis situations when organizations need to ensure public service delivery.
Drawing on recent public management research, we adopt the following definition 
of public service innovation ‘[. . .] the development and implementation of a novel idea 
by a Public Service Organization (PSO) to create or improve public value within an 
ecosystem’ (Chen, Walker, and Sawhney 2020, 1677). The debates on the extent to 
which PSOs are engaged in innovation (from minimal efforts to systematic institutio-
nalizing of innovation activities) leads us to consider whether such entities accept and 
engage in risk-taking, rather than seeking to minimalize risk or its effects (Brown and 
Osborne 2013; Hjelmar 2021). Such debates may be seen in a new light when respond-
ing to a crisis event or taking decisions to ensure a better response in the future. In such 
events, public and private organizations must operate within a time-compressed 
situation to deliver what Bessant, Rush, and Trifilova (2015) term ‘crisis-driven 
innovation’; organizations undertake an agile approach: acceptance of fast failure, 
rapid experimentation, and learning and deployment of ‘scrum teams’ (Morris et al. 
2014). Such agility may call for organizations to operate virtually, as opposed from 
‘bricks-and-mortar’ sites, to quickly acquire dispersed and differing information 
(Wilson and Doz 2011).
Providing a useful means of distinguishing relevant forms of innovation and how 
they impact PSO strategy, capacity, and operations, Chen, Walker, and Sawhney 
(2020) proposed six types of public service innovation. The six types are divided 
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between an internal (mission, management, service), and external (policy, partner, 
citizen) innovation locus. Focusing on an internal PSO orientation, mission innova-
tions involve the introduction of a new purpose or worldview, for example, large-scale 
transformation to address the current climate and ecological emergency. Management 
innovations include the adoption of a new (to the organization) practice, process, 
structure, or technique (technological or administrative) to improve the PSO’s ability 
to further organizational goals (Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2010; Roehrich et al. 
2019). This type of innovation is likely to underpin the ability to marshal internal staff 
and resources quickly and effectively to an unexpected event. Service innovations are 
described as the visible result of public service innovations which may be the result of 
how all other types of innovation are applied and experienced by the clients of PSOs.
Where PSOs are ill-equipped to tackle black swan events, it is critical to work closely 
with external organizations. Chen, Walker, and Sawhney (2020) argued that policy 
innovations can deliver new obligations and benefits to citizens, directing a PSO’s 
resources to a relevant ecosystem, which in an emergency situation, can provide critical 
direction and support to where it is needed most (Torfing and Ansell 2017). Partner 
innovations provide PSOs with the ability to leverage competencies that exist outside 
the organization, which avoids having to replicate those assets in-house. Crisis situa-
tions rely on effective sharing of information, skills, resources, and the combined effect 
of whole systems working together (Ansell and Torfing 2020). Lastly, citizen innova-
tions establish new platforms to facilitate collaboration between citizens and PSO 
managers, and if the citizen are involved in the innovation process, they have also 
become an active co-creator of services (e.g. calls for the greater use of citizen 
assemblies by environmental activist groups and the importance of public service co- 
production of environmental outcomes; Alonso et al. 2019). Although useful for this 
study, we argue the need for further research to better understand how these innova-
tion types are initiated and deployed in crisis situations, where the challenge of 
accessing and collecting relevant information may hinder innovative decision- 
making within PSOs.
Decision-making during black swan events: managing information asymmetry
Prior studies have investigated how to manage ‘known unknowns’ (e.g. costs and 
duration of defined activities), but provide limited insights into how organizations 
manage black swan events (Ramasesh and Browning 2014). Known unknowns are 
‘uncertainties which can be described probabilistically and addressed through the 
conventional techniques of risk management’ (Ramasesh and Browning 2014, 191). 
In line with Taleb’s notion of ‘black swans’ (Taleb 2010), unknown unknowns are 
situations ‘when unexpected, surprising outcomes are encountered resulting in poten-
tially catastrophic outcomes’.
Feduzi and Runde (2014) delineate such black swan events into two further 
categories: (i) ‘knowable unknowns’ or ‘knowable black swans” are events that could 
have been foreseen by an organization, and had the potential to be known unknowns; 
and (ii) ‘unknowable unknowns’ are unknown unknowns that cannot be foreseen or 
known and, despite access to all possible information, could not be transformed into 
known unknowns. Feduzi and Runde (2014) go on to offer 9/11 as an example of 
a knowable black swan event, or knowable unknown. Although for most individuals, 9/ 
11 was an unknowable black swan event it was knowable for some. Two years prior to 
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9/11, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) had contemplated 
the use of airliners as missiles, going so far as to simulate such attacks on both the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (Feduzi and Runde 2014).
We argue that for the COVID-19 pandemic, governments were warned and aware 
of the catastrophic impact of a possible major global pandemic but demonstrated 
limited preparedness. For instance, in response to the 2009 Swine Flu outbreak, the UK 
government created a national pandemic stockpile of healthcare supplies (Channel 4 
News, 7 May 2020) and the most recent UK national risk register identified a pandemic 
as having the highest impact with one of the highest likelihoods to occur (Cabinet 
Office 2017). Given all this, one might expect a high level of preparedness by those 
most likely to be affected (e.g. the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), care services 
and providers – Flanagan and Collins 2020), but this was not the case – over the last 
decade the UK pandemic stockpile was greatly reduced and much of the remaining 
stock out-of-date (Channel 4 News, 7 May 2020).
Black swan events (knowable unknowns) are characterized by information asym-
metry- an organization either lacks relevant information (uncertainty) or needs to deal 
with information messiness (equivocality) in order to make decisions in a time-bound 
manner (Galbraith 1974; Turner and Makhija 2012). In the UK and beyond, healthcare 
organizations responsible for developing a COVID-19 response are not limited to the 
public sector and include, for instance, private healthcare providers and suppliers of 
essential equipment and services, often resulting in misalignments in terms of policy 
and objectives (Caldwell, Roehrich, and George 2017). Moreover, organizations are 
often confronted with conflicting information that may not be aligned to achieve 
a shared goal (Dahlmann and Roehrich 2019; Aben et al. forthcoming), which is 
necessary if quick decisions must be made to save lives. For this research we focus 
on implications for PSOs and how they manage information internally, and where 
relevant, collaborate with external organizations in the provision of public services.
Based on information processing theory (IPT), an organization’s abilities to process 
information in a more accurate and timely manner manifests in superior performance 
(Galbraith 1974; Yu et al. 2019). For this study, these abilities result from an organiza-
tion’s knowledge and skills in collecting, interpreting, and transferring relevant infor-
mation to the characteristics of the black swan event. Reducing information 
asymmetry (uncertainty and equivocality) within and between organizations is vital 
to achieve high performance (Corner, Kinicki, and Keats 1994; Zhao, Feng, and Shi 
2018). The more uncertainty and equivocality organizations are exposed to (which is 
high in black swan events), the more information needs to be gathered and processed 
to realize a given performance level (Burns and Wholey 1993; Dahlmann and Roehrich 
2019). Whereas collecting more information and starting to make sense of it following 
an intelligent client approach reduces an organization’s information uncertainty, 
equivocality requires cognitive skills by managers and organizations and an analytical 
ability to distinguish novelty, likely utility, and opportunist market behaviours (Taylor 
2019). Collected data are often ill-structured, potentially difficult to evaluate, requiring 
more than one organization to make sense of it (Daft and Lengel 1986; Bode et al. 
2011). In the context of complex public services, information also needs to be trans-
ferred to other key organizations to ensure collaborative decision-making and 
a coordinated response.
In past studies, IPT has, for example, been used to assess the impact of internal 
manufacturing complexity on the organizations’ triple bottom line (Wiengarten et al. 
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2017), and to study the mechanisms managers can use to create internal strategic 
consensus (Rosado Feger 2014). Recent work has extended IPT to an inter- 
organizational level, addressing how organizations develop information-processing 
capabilities to deal with supply chain disruptions (Bode et al. 2011) and sustainability- 
related uncertainty (Dahlmann and Roehrich 2019). So far, limited attention has been 
paid to information asymmetry in black swan events, and how organizations address 
information asymmetry to deliver public services (an exemption is the study by Aben 
et al. forthcoming). Black swan events are typified by some information being available, 
often outside the organizations. For instance, for COVID-19, information on pan-
demics could be found in the UK’s national risk register (Cabinet Office 2017). This 
information is often quite messy, and must be interpreted for the specific informa-
tional needs of an organization. For the healthcare sector to offer a more concerted 
response to COVID-19, critical information must be shared between organizations.
Methods
Research setting and design
We conducted an in-depth case design of key UK healthcare organizations, allowing us 
to address the question of how public service organizations innovate to address 
information asymmetry, and drive decision-making in a black swan (knowable 
unknown) event such as COVID-19. Consistent with our objective of identifying an 
explanation of a complex phenomenon in its natural context (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007), we adopted a case study approach which yielded multiple observations of 
complex decision-making challenges.
While the multiple case organizations we investigated do not provide the confi-
dence of a large n sample (as given in a survey), multiple factors deemed the adopted 
approach particularly appropriate. First, the UK healthcare sector was identified as an 
ideal case setting due to its inherent information asymmetry and required innovative 
decision-making in confronting a black swan situation (viz COVID-19). Second, our 
study focused on public and private organizations to deliver vital public services 
(namely healthcare services). Over the past 20 years, several parts of the UK healthcare 
sector have been privatized (similar situations can be found in healthcare sectors 
around the world – Barlow, Roehrich, and Wright 2013; Wright, Barlow, and 
Roehrich 2019) and services affected by COVID-19 are also delivered by the private 
sector or through public-private relationships (e.g. General Practice (GP) surgeries, 
older people’s services and end-of-life care – (Roehrich, Lewis, and George 2014; The 
King’s Fund 2019; The Health Foundation 2020). Relationships between public and 
private organizations often experience information asymmetry due to different objec-
tives and goals of public and private organizations (Roehrich and Kivleniece 
forthcoming).
Third, accessing such a commercially sensitive topic (information processing) by 
interviewing front-line managers and directors during a live black swan event is rare. 
Previous studies have focused on ‘disasters’ caused or created by organizational failures 
(e.g. Gephart 1993; Labib et al. 2019). For instance, Weick (1993) analysed the 1949 
Mann Gulch fire to ‘re-examine our thinking about temporary systems, structuration, 
non-disclosure intimacy, intergroup dynamics, and team building’ (p. 628). Similarly, 
the emergence of the sub-field of supply chain risk, for example, has been directly 
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influenced by the impact of events such as the 2008 economic crisis or the Japanese 
Tsunami or Mattel’s problems with lead paint (e.g. Chopra and Sodhi 2014). These 
studies often relied (solely) on secondary and retrospective data collected where were 
analysed by somebody other than the researcher (e.g. Brown 2004; Kalra, Lewis, and 
Roehrich 2021). In contrast to previous studies on crisis events, we had the unique 
opportunity to collect ‘live’ data during COVID-19.
Data collection and sources
We used a two-stage recursive strategy. In stage 1 (April 2020), we interviewed a crisis 
expert to understand key aspects of information asymmetry and particular challenges 
of a black swan event, as well as collecting and analysing over 40 external policy and 
industry reports (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008) including the UK National Risk 
Register for National Emergencies, Channel 4 News reporting on personal protective 
equipment (PPE) shortages, and OECD investigation into industry response to the 
2008 crisis. This helped us to develop a storyline of the pandemic including, but not 
limited to, the initial awareness of the threat of a global pandemic, evidence of 
information asymmetry in the sector and the challenges posed by these asymmetries.
In stage 2 (April – May 2020), we conducted, recorded, and transcribed ten 
additional semi-structured interviews with informants to help us better understand 
an organization’s specific information asymmetry, innovative responses, as well as the 
how information was collected, interpreted and transferred to make decisions. An 
interview protocol facilitated our semi-structured interviews, and included general 
questions oriented towards understanding the particular challenges of information 
uncertainty and equivocality, before delving deeper into the key activities and inno-
vative responses by the organization. Collecting data in real-time (i.e. during the 
ongoing COVID-19 situation) helped to minimize respondents’ biases (Golden 
1992) as we spoke to key decision-makers in the UK healthcare sector during the 
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Across both stages, we collected over 65 pages of interview transcripts (single 
spaced), putting great effort into gathering reliable and objective information from 
informants (Alvesson 2003) primarily involved in procurement, where the major 
challenge was to develop innovative responses to deliver immediate support and 
equipment to healthcare workers. We interviewed ten senior experts with established 
careers in the UK healthcare sector (Heads and Directors), across disparate hierarch-
ical and functional roles (covering procurement, finance, and human resources) from 
key PSOs and their public service suppliers (Table 1) to access diverse perspectives, 
allowing data triangulation. Organizations and interviewees were selected based on 
their first-hand experience of managing their organization’s response to COVID-19 
and visibility of sector-wide interventions. Individual interviewees represented func-
tions with either local, regional, national and, in some cases, international responsi-
bility. Data gathering continued until an in-depth understanding of the phenomena 
under investigation was reached and additional data were not relevant to the devel-
opment of new insights.
We applied specific criteria and measures to ensure validity and reliability of our 
findings (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008) including, but not limited to, deriving 
a research framework from extant literature, and offering clarity about how data were 
collected and analysed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and subsequently 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 W. PHILLIPS ET AL.
reviewed by the respective informants. Finally, we maintained a database with all 
interview data and documents used in the analysis to increase transparency and 
reliability.
Data analysis
Data collection and analysis processes were conducted in parallel based on how data 
matched existing or emerging understanding of the phenomena under study (Strauss 
and Corbin 1990). This ‘ground-up’ approach helped to develop theory which is 
closely linked to our data (Golden-Biddle and Locke 2007). The data were carefully 
analyzed in a multi-stage process. In the first stage, we analyzed our rich archival data 
and initial interviews. This helped us to understand better the healthcare industry, and 
the current challenges facing the industry during COVID-19. This step was vital before 
analyzing in-depth the remaining interviews with key informants. In Stage 2, we 
analyzed interview data to understand the details of information asymmetry, and 
how organizations addressed them by collecting, interpreting, and transferring infor-
mation to drive innovative decision-making.
Analysis included broader codes such as case organization, background informa-
tion, and more specific codes focusing on the concepts of our study such as informa-
tion uncertainty and equivocality, innovative responses, information gathering, sense- 
making, and transferring. Each researcher initially created a list of first-order codes 
based on extant literature which was then compared with each other. Differences were 
jointly discussed until finalizing a working coding scheme to individually code the first 
interview. We also added to the coding scheme key information processing practices 
that arose from the data analysis, but which had not appeared in extant literature. All 
our findings were discussed across all co-authors to aid understanding of key concepts 
and relationships. Differences were resolved by trying to reconcile differing interpreta-
tions. Thus, our coding was not completed until we reached consensus on each 
construct, forcing 100% interrater reliability. The analysis focused on investigating 
patterns across organizations in addressing information asymmetry in the healthcare 
sector when faced with a knowable black swan situation. Our findings were later cross- 
checked with key informants and archival data.
Findings
This section presents the case analyses, supported by empirical evidence presented in 
Tables 2 and 3. First, we uncover key challenges organizations faced during COVID-19 
and how they responded. Then, we unpack the key activities organizations conducted 
in addressing information asymmetry.
Responding to challenges posed by COVID-19: public service innovation
Based on all interviewees, few public and private organizations were ready for the 
global pandemic. Although pandemics were identified as a high risk at the UK country- 
level (Cabinet Office 2017), Interviewee F suggested this appeared to have not trans-
lated into high-level industrial planning: ‘We have assets of about £1.2bn invested in UK 
healthcare projects, schools, renewables and social housing. [. . .] I cannot recall one of 
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the board meetings, or in any risk matrix, ever having anybody raising a discussion about 
pandemics’.
All interviewees confirmed the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and pointed to limited, immediate, preparation beyond three-months emergency 
stockpiling for Brexit, which is particular to the UK at this point-in-time. Raising the 
broad question of systemic resilience, Interviewee C argued: ‘If you imagine if we had 
not had that three months’ worth of stock already in the warehouses, where would we 
have been? I think that is quite fascinating how we have all gone very lean procurement. 
But actually, when you are running an essential service, is that the right solution? [. . .] 
We again were on the back foot because Germany who was a big provider of ventilators 
and PPE were using it themselves.’
Yet, despite forewarnings, participants expressed frustration regarding the lack of 
preparedness and speed of response despite awareness of the oncoming pandemic: 
‘I would probably say – and this was something that surprised me was how slow the NHS 
and senior management were to respond. The COVID-19 was not a surprise to everyone 
because it happened in China, and we know it is slowly creeping across the globe’ 
(Interviewee C). This was reiterated by two recent reports from the UK House of 
Table 3. Additional examples of data.





‘Working with PHE [Public Health England, a central body] we have had lots of issues 
with changes in guidance etc. from that point of view. That has caused lots of issues. 
Certainly, sometimes I have had to get information from our military liaison forum 
and through the local resilience forum which has been interesting’. (Interviewee A) 
‘It is challenging to secure new information, because there are not any local sources of 
information to browse through, although there are things like insolvency databases. 
There is a Cabinet Office tool being developed around how to manage new suppliers 
and risk assessing them. [. . .] We do work with other organizations to share 
information’. (Interviewee G)




‘Having a broader reach on a full group is vital [. . .] A system that is able to pull real 
time data from each of the different areas of the business would have been 
advantageous. Because I have to plug the gap by having individuals in each of the 
business facilitate the information exchange. Which is time- and resource- 
consuming. [. . .] You could almost circumvent that by having real time data again 
which is presented to us centrally in a dashboard view’. (Interviewee E) 
‘In terms of technology, on the data side of things are pretty archaic. I mean, there has 
been some tools to capture data [. . .] I mean it is so far behind, not to anywhere near 
where it needs to be [. . .] but COVID-19 has speeded things up. [. . .] We have now 
source coding and other things which normally would be held up by red tape or 
debates on the specification and interoperability. There has been a lot of that stuff 
signed off and we have been told “just get on with it”’. (Interviewee I)
(3) Transferring infor-
mation to make 
joint decisions
‘I probably have about three conference calls a day. I know that the director in purchasing 
has many more. Where we are talking individually with either Trusts or the command 
group within the Trust. We talk through where we are with our work. So, they have 
a national PPE call, they have a local PPE call, they have a local [hierarchy] Bronze 
command, Silver command and then it goes up to Gold command which is then all the 
execs and the chairs discuss it. There are lots of different boards that everybody is talking 
to. I would probably say there is more communication going on at the moment than 
there has ever been’. (Interviewee C) 
‘Where decisions have been made in the light of something centrally, the central message 
comes out and it is different to [our approach]. I think for us we gather all of those 
different sources and information that that we would be able to bring together with 
decisions on how we can best support our Trusts. [. . .] We are trying to take a view across 
everything. And then help to make a decision that way for our Trusts’. (Interviewee J)
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Commons Public Accounts Committee (the UK’s spending watchdog) and The 
National Audit Office. At the outset of the pandemic the UK lost a ‘crucial month’; 
the sourcing of additional ventilators occurred more than a month after the World 
Health Organization declared the pandemic a public health emergency (House of 
Commons 2020). According to the National Audit Office, the UK’s slow response to 
the sourcing of PPE resulted in the UK paying extortionate prices for new equipment 
which, for the most part, arrived after the first wave of infections, the delay costing the 
UK £10 billion (Comptroller and Auditor General 2020).
Table 2 illustrates some key challenges faced by interviewees’ respective organiza-
tions. Interviewees mentioned innovation was needed to reprioritize and reconfigure 
staff and resources, ensure rapid acquisition of essential stock through new channels, 
and build relationships with local, regional, and national stakeholders within and across 
the sector. Our findings are also categorized according to the innovation typology 
developed by Chen, Walker, and Sawhney (2020). Given the professional profile of 
our participants (procurement, finance, and human resources), it was expected that the 
emphasis across almost all cases was on management innovation (type III in Table 3), 
resulting in a transformational step-change in how PSOs and their suppliers responded 
to the crisis. Furthermore, the internal orientation and focus on building internal 
competence (as an intelligent client) was found to be critical where coordination across 
PSO boundaries and where external partners was required. In terms of future planning, 
PSOs might consider leveraging novel approaches within other types of innovation, 
such as type IV (partner innovation) and VI (citizen innovation), where data and 
information sharing with the public might improve desired outcomes to crisis situations 
(i.e. decentralized, co-production of PPE to required standards using 3D printers).
Information asymmetry and processing when making decisions
The following sections uncover how organizations addressed information asymmetry 
during COVID-19 (see Table 3).
Addressing information uncertainty by collecting information
Interviewees involved in supporting healthcare services mentioned, at the early phases 
of the crisis, issues of coordination, a lack of information and a need to respond to their 
immediate stakeholders: ‘One of the challenges with information [to support making] 
decisions is that links between what is happening locally and what is happening centrally 
at times have not been very clear’ (Interviewee J). This appears to support data from 
news reports (as reported by BBC News on 12 April 2020, Channel 4 News, 
7 May 2020). In the UK, healthcare services are delivered locally, but receive guidance, 
annual budgets, and central government directives from the Department of Health 
(DoH). Interviewee B argued: ‘Government should be able to obtain certain information 
for the centrally procured stuff and an understanding of the true availability of products. 
If we were told “this is the national picture – which is why you cannot get some products”. 
We would use that information to give people a bit of reassurance and understanding’.
Interviewees pointed towards some decision-making which was not explained to 
organizations, causing further information uncertainty: ‘The Centre has made some 
panic decisions which means the level of confidence has been reduced significantly’ 
(Interviewee G). This was also reinforced by a report in The Telegraph (7 May 2020) 
on the procurement of PPE from Turkey. Similarly, in the context of information gaps 
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and effective decision-making, interviewee B mentioned: ‘We cannot rely on the central 
provision – it just does not work for us. It has been hugely beneficial in some areas but 
without a team on the ground working well, the difficulties would be much more acute’.
In this fast-moving crisis, key information can have limited time value, creating 
uncertainty through lack of relevant information, as noted by Interviewee H:
We [healthcare service procurement team] still have to follow the process and we do not, avoid 
that we buy from contracts [established agreements], we do all these sorts of things but if I need 
masks and they are in China, and I need to source those masks. I have not got time to obtain 
three quotes [established procedures], because as soon as I go to the three quotes these products 
that were available have gone.
Similarly, rapid decision-making was critical: ‘You would like to have more comparative 
offers from different sources, but there simply was not enough time to get them’ 
(Interviewee D). This led to situations where many organizations were ‘making 
decisions quicker and potentially based on more imperfect information as you would 
have otherwise’ (Interviewee D).
At the outset of the crisis, interviewees indicated that they adapted their processes 
and decision-making: ‘We are normally risk-averse in terms of contract terms and 
making sure that we covered ourselves in case the supplier does not deliver. [. . .] 
Procurement went back to the basics of contract as it means nothing unless we can get 
the goods and services’ (Interviewee J). A noticeable trend was, over time, various 
interventions allowed organizations to respond with more confidence, utilizing deci-
sion-support tools: ‘Although the market is very volatile. For example, you are paying 
30p for something and next minute 60p and then £1.20. [. . .] We have quite a lot of 
analytic tools as we are now collecting details on a weekly basis. [. . .] We now know who 
is buying what around the country. We then started to find out who is buying things 
outside the national system’ (Interviewee H). Additionally, the development of new 
collaborative relationships with key stakeholders, even competitors, was vital:
There is a lot more transparency with regards to our various relationships. [. . .] For instance, 
we noticed some product shortages, and we talked to people who run the airports. Before the 
crisis, I would never have gotten involved with airports, but we both had a similar need for 
something. [. . .] There is the general willingness to share more information as well. We have 
started working with some people who you might consider competitors (Interviewee I).
There was general consensus that, as a result of COVID-19, interviewees’ respective 
organizations had set about developing more efficient information collection pro-
cesses, which they hoped would remain in place post-pandemic:
In terms of the way that we capture it [information] the way we use it. The way that we work 
online through MS Teams and share electronically rather than, printing out paper. I think this 
is absolutely something that will probably stay with us because I do not think we should be 
going back. We have learned a lot from all this (Interview H).
Making sense of information to address information equivocality
Interviewees reported on various approaches for making sense of information; 
some perceived as a critical enabler, underpinning organizations’ capability to 
respond effectively. For instance, interviewee I referred to the use of a software 
platform:
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A nation-wide ‘live’ programme called ‘Mutual Aid’ uses a software platform that allows any 
Trust [a devolved regional healthcare PSO] that is short of products to pull down products 
from another Trust that has surplus of that particular product. That has all been new, when 
COVID started, people were working with spreadsheets.
Relational approaches, focusing on better coordination were used too:
Having weekly checkpoints with every Trust, having conversations over the web about where 
other organizations are seeing demand, where are we seeing the problems, is anyone else seeing 
those problems. You now have an open forum where people can share and help each other. You 
want to avoid situations where one hospital was provided with an excess of student nurses to 
help from a healthcare assistance perspective, while another hospital had a real shortage. [. . .] 
This information is vital and needs to be processed by one organization and passed on to others 
in a timely manner (Interviewee J).
Likewise, at the national level, the ‘Parallel Supply Chain’ (an organization set up by the 
UK Department of Health (DoH) in March 2020 to address mounting issues relating to 
the sourcing and distribution of critical healthcare supplies) had limited information 
regarding PPE held by local organizations. This involved undertaking daily engage-
ment with stakeholders from NHS regions, local resilience forums, and the National 
Supply Disruption Response team (an emergency helpline for delivering to organiza-
tions struggling to source PPE) which helped improve the distribution process. From 
4 May 2020 this was further improved to include information collected from local 
Trusts (Comptroller and Auditor General 2020).
Adapting internal processes was an important feature across interviewees to 
ensure information was ’correctly and timely’ interpreted: ‘We just made our board 
meetings more frequent and shorter. We have changed our communication processes 
including more frequent touchpoints so that those key decisions get discussed’ 
(Interviewee I). Similarly, ‘in some cases, you report after rather than before you 
would do something. It is just about having a process around that speeds up informa-
tion processing and decision-making’ (Interviewee H). Some, changes were even 
more structural as Interviewee H went on to report: ‘We have brought up 
a completely new team that runs an internal supply chain to speed up decision- 
making and processes’.
Transferring information to make joint decisions
Throughout the crisis, information flows and feedback between end-users, buyers, and 
suppliers were significantly affected, testing ‘organizational resilience and speed of 
adaptation’ to the crisis situation. Interviewees A, C, F and J reported challenges 
reaching staff who were no longer operating in their usual offices, or on furlough, 
and of having to convince contractors to return on-site. Meetings (from exec board to 
operational levels) were more frequent, ensuring timely engagements and updates 
within and across organizations.
Whereas these new ways of working may not have occurred in the short-term 
prior to COVID-19, the knowable black swan situation has tested what tasks can be 
executed and monitored remotely. Some interviewees anticipated their organization 
and key stakeholders may not completely revert back to former pre-pandemic 
practices. This aligns with reports suggesting crises like COVID-19 drive innovation 
and new ways of operating (OECD 2009; Entrepreneur Europe 2020). Interviewee 
G commented: ‘Just over two months ago, we shifted to MS Teams and Zoom. We 
already had an electronic tendering system and databases, but now we are also 
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homeworking quite extensively’. Similarly, Interviewee B stated that the organization 
has ‘information drops going out into organization-wide huddles [information sharing 
platforms], interlinking with logistics command structure for the region’ to improve 
collaboration with stakeholders. There are challenges in transferring information 
and working with other organizations in knowable black swan events: ‘The scale of 
some of the decisions we are having to make, and the money we are having to spend, 
suddenly people step back and think this is actually more difficult than you think’ 
(Interviewee A).
Looking across organizational boundaries, the importance of collaboration was 
strongly argued by most, even with competitors, as evidenced by Interviewee I: 
‘There is a general willingness to share more information as well. We have started 
working with some people you might consider competitors’. Also, interviewee 
C pointed out: ‘One of the things that has made us realize how important collaboration 
is was where there are national failures. We realized how on a regional basis we could be 
more collaborative and transfer information for joint decision-making’. Table 3 provides 
an overview of additional quotes across key themes.
At a national level, the Cabinet Office also relied on a range of solutions. In 
discussing the success of the ‘Ventilator Challenge’ in promoting the scale-up in UK 
production of ventilators, a report by the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee (2020) attributed the programme’s success to the chief commercial 
officer’s experience of managing engineering and product development companies. 
This put him in a strong position to instigate the ‘Ventilator Challenge’. Also, the 
report highlighted the support from cross-functional teams drawn up form NHS 
clinicians, the Medical and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), other 
government departments, medical device testing experts, and PA Consulting. 
Correspondingly, the Department of Health and Social Care drew on the 
Department for International Trade and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
connections to help purchase and secure ventilators directly from China more 
rapidly. The Cabinet Office too worked with the Ministry of Defence’s Cost 
Assurance and Analysis Service to assess orders and ensure that they were close 
to market value (House of Commons 2020).
Discussion
This research contributes to the under-researched and under-theorized study of public 
sector innovation, and in particular strategies for more effective governance in crisis 
scenarios (Ansell and Torfing 2020; Chen, Walker, and Sawhney 2020). Drawing on 
IPT, we posited that information uncertainty and equivocality in a crisis situation is 
addressed by information gathering, sense-making, and transferring. Exploring public 
and private organizations in the healthcare sector during a live black swan event, we 
explored how managers at the front-line innovated to address information asymmetry 
to aid decision-making.
Theoretical contributions
This study theoretically underpinned and empirically investigated black swan events 
which are less explored in prior studies (Ramasesh and Browning 2014). More specifi-
cally, we answer the question of how PSOs innovate to address information asymmetry 
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and drive decision-making in a black swan (knowable unknown) event such as COVID- 
19. This study presents a novel use of the IPT lens to illustrate how organizations deal 
with information asymmetry in these knowable unknown situations (Table 4).
Our findings show, at the initial stages of a black swan event, PSOs are tasked with 
delivering immediate support, in our case to key healthcare workers, but within 
significant constraints (e.g. lockdown, demand uncertainty) and under time- 
compressed conditions (e.g. dramatically reduced lead times – from three weeks to 
next-day delivery). We observed how PSOs focused on management and organiza-
tional innovation (Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009), rather than radical and 
technological innovation, exploring ways of doing activities ‘differently’ as opposed to 
‘better’ (Bessant et al. 2005). Organizations in our study were undertaking not new-to- 
the-world but certainly new-to-the-organization approaches which, based on our 
findings, will be sustained post-pandemic. For many, this required a cultural, as well 
as organizational, shift including, but not limited to, moving from a ‘9–5ʹ desk-based 
mindset towards virtual teams and highly flexible work patterns, and more sophisti-
cated collaborative information sharing across boundaries.
Within this context, organizations were confronted with significant time con-
straints; failure to source healthcare equipment would have significant, high profile 
consequences for the spread and containment of COVID-19. Organizations were 
charged with finding ways to speed up and improve communications internally and 
to key stakeholders. Thus, organizations moved from structuring around specific 
healthcare categories towards structures able to deal with: (i) the immediate fallout 
from the knowable black swan event; (ii) preparation for the situation as it evolved; and 
(iii) learning new practices, gaining a better understanding of what the ‘new normal’ 
would be, and its organizational implications.
The time-compressed conditions have also given rise to major changes in the 
decision-making process, resulting in a significant shortening of the chain of 
Table 4. Challenges facing organizations under ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘knowable black swan event’ conditions.
‘Business-as-usual’ ‘Knowable black swan event’
Innovative  
response
Generally incremental innovation Agile, time compressed organizational 
innovation focused on doing things 
‘quicker’ as opposed to ‘better’
Information  
uncertainty &  
equivocality
Some uncertainty, but organization has 
some foresight of market demand and 
contracts in place with preferred 
suppliers; organizations have more time 
to interpret messy information
No certainty, messy information from 
a range of sources, no clear information 
on stock levels, staff resourcing or 




Methodical, traditional tendering process, 
over several weeks gathering information 
from a range of suppliers
Rapid over 1 − 2 days, ‘good is good 
enough’. Information gathered from 
suppliers, often local, and based on 
information from trusted network
Information 
processing
Tightly governed and hierarchical with 
major decisions made by a board and 
senior executives
Simplified decision-process, decisions made 
by a small select team on the day and 
more autonomy given to teams/ 




Fed out weekly or monthly through 
traditional sources, e.g. newsletter, group, 
or team emails
Daily to key stakeholders – key stakeholders 
by phone, others through emails. Internal 
stakeholders through daily updates and 
conference calls
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command – managers have been given more flexibility and discretion. Quick decision- 
making was considered important as major decisions needed to be made almost 
immediately, but through the creation of smaller boards and flatter hierarchies, 
organizations learned to manoeuvre more quickly and flexibly as the knowable black 
swan event evolved.
At the outset of the pandemic, organizations spent some time and resources 
locating information from external sources (e.g. Public Health England, NHS 
England) to address a lack of information (i.e. information uncertainty) within the 
organization and to ‘define the problem at hand and its boundaries’. Interviewees 
stressed the nature of the situation did not allow sufficient time to collect all relevant 
and required information – individuals had to make decisions based on what was 
available at that point-in-time. In other words, decisions had to be made on ‘some 
information’, which was relevant now, rather than aiming for a ‘complete picture’ with 
potentially outdated information later.
The time-compressed nature of the crisis did not allow organizations sufficient time 
to collect all required information. Often information was not available from one 
single source, but a myriad of sources: a time- and resource-consuming process. The 
early phase of the knowable black swan event was also characterized by organizations 
spending very limited time making sense of collected information, and sparse infor-
mation was passed on to other organizations. We argue, at the outset, organizations 
have limited time and resources to address information uncertainty completely, for-
cing them to neglect making sense of messy information to address equivocality, and 
often having to ignore an approach that would call for collecting all relevant informa-
tion to address information uncertainty (as suggested by prior work; e.g. Bode et al. 
2011). This then hinders joint decision-making as any relevant information was not 
passed on to partnering organizations. These findings contrast to prior studies using 
IPT which mainly explored information processing in settings where addressing 
information uncertainty and equivocality supersedes quick decision-making (e.g. 
Dahlmann and Roehrich 2019).
In later phases of black swan events, individual organizations have mainly satisfied 
their initial need to collect information to address their information uncertainty 
(switching to a focus on new, and different, information uncertainty such as emerging 
equipment requirements for post-lockdown). The findings show organizations devel-
oped more efficient information collection processes, and were able to deal with 
information equivocality. Whilst decisions had to be made in a fairly time- 
compressed manner, we found organizations went on to interpret information for 
the organization’s own decision-making, and then transferred relevant information to 
other organizations.
Our analysis suggests, for black swan events, information processing is by no means 
a linear process, nor does it include all information processing activities to make 
decisions. In contrast to ‘business-as-usual’ decision-making situations (Wolf and 
Egelhoff 2002; Koufteros, Verghese, and Lucianetti 2014), knowable black swan events 
are characterized by decision-making in which information uncertainty is addressed 
first by collecting some degree of information to allow initial and organization-specific 
decision-making, while later phases address information equivocality, and joint deci-
sion-making with other organizations, supporting a more collaborative approach to 
tackling such crisis situations (Premkumar, Ramamurthy, and Saunders 2005; Hartley, 
Sørensen, and Torfing 2013; Tee, Davies, and Whyte 2019).
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Boundary conditions and further research
We closely examined how organizations address information asymmetry to drive 
innovative decision-making in knowable black swan situations. The study focused 
on data collected during a live black swan event. Future research should compare our 
findings with the same black swan event, namely COVID-19, in other sectors and 
countries, exploring how organizations address information asymmetry, and explore 
whether the innovative processes employed during the pandemic have persisted, or 
whether organizations have reverted back to ‘the same old procedure’. While we 
believe many of our findings are relevant for other organizations in other contexts, 
the impact of different regulations and legal systems should be further explored.
Understanding the dynamic nature of information asymmetry and processing 
needs throughout the whole crisis situation warrants further research. Future studies 
may use behavioural experiments to uncover the role that different individuals play in 
addressing information asymmetry at different stages of the crisis situation. For 
instance, further research should explore who, at what level (e.g. business, corporate, 
subsidiary) and in what job role (e.g. legal, management, operation) uses what type of 
governance mechanism (contractual or relational – Howard et al. 2019; Roehrich et al. 
2020) to gather, analyse, and transfer information. Future research may also unpack 
different levels of service complexity, and its impact on the use of governance mechan-
isms to address information asymmetry (e.g. Kreye, Roehrich, and Lewis 2015).
Implications for practice and policy
Our study has important implications for organizations and managers seeking to 
manage information asymmetry during knowable black swan events. Organizations 
should first address information uncertainty by collecting information from internal 
and external sources. In black swan events, it is important to collect some information, 
rather than seeking to gain a complete picture as decisions need to be made quickly. 
Later phases of the black swan event should be used to interpret information, consider 
innovative ways of doing so, and collaboration with other organizations (potentially 
even competitors) to interpret and transfer information for quick and joint decision- 
making.
For policymakers, we argue that in order to implement a rapid and effective 
innovative response, there is a need for a reciprocal transfer of information between 
organizations operating at the national level through to local health and social care 
organizations. As our study shows, the lack of such end-to-end sharing and processing 
of information led to costly mistakes, major delays in the sourcing and distribution of 
essential medical supplies, and contributed towards the UK’s inability to mount an 
innovative response to COVID-19 during the early stages of the pandemic.
Our research strengthens the case for PSOs to develop an intelligent client cap-
ability, as the basis for addressing information uncertainty and equivocality, and to 
rapidly direct efforts towards an innovative response in a crisis situation. With an 
internal orientation in mind, we expect public leadership at board-level to radically 
reconsider their approach to risk and innovation; incentivize managerial behaviours 
and structures that build resilience; and invest in collaborative information sharing 
platforms and practices designed to assure public service continuity. PSOs can also 
direct through an external orientation, how they can open up data, and sharing of 
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current operational challenges to work flexibly and horizontally with other sectors as 
a matter of driving innovation policy. Similarly, PSOs will benefit from new formal 
innovation pathways that attract solutions from external partners and others in the 
complex public service ecosystem.
Conclusions
This paper explored how organizations address information asymmetry in a black 
swan event by using information-processing activities. We adopted IPT to explore how 
PSOs innovate to address information asymmetry and drive decision-making in 
a black swan event (COVID-19). Building on a rich dataset, including detailed inter-
views with frontline managers during COVID-19, we contribute to innovation 
research in crisis situations by specifically investigating knowable crisis situations. 
We illustrate how PSOs focused on management and organizational innovation rather 
than radical and technological innovation, exploring ways of doing activities ‘differ-
ently’ as opposed to ‘better’. Thus, this study offers one of the first theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded investigation of information asymmetry in know-
able crisis situations using IPT. In contrast to ‘business-as-usual’ decision-making 
situations, crisis situations are characterized by decision-making in which information 
uncertainty is addressed first by collecting some degree of information to allow initial 
and individual organization’s decision-making, while later phases address information 
equivocality and joint decision-making with other organizations. We hope that our 
findings will encourage further research to augment our understanding of how orga-
nizations address information asymmetry in black swan events to drive innovative 
decision-making.
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